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SPEAK NO EVIL: MGM V. GROKSTER’S POTENTIAL FREE
SPEECH IMPLICATIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE INDUCEMENT
STANDARD AND SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR EXPRESSION
Scott J. Sholder ∗
INTRODUCTION
After the downfall of the infamous file-sharing program Napster
and its progeny, such as Aimster, a new breed of peer-to-peer (“P2P”)
digital file-sharing programs took over the illicit downloading mar1
ketplace. This next generation of software sought to replace its
fallen comrades and hoped to reel in an already-existing user base
2
which was salivating for a new way to amass free media files, while
the recording and movie industries continued their lawsuit campaign
3
as they had against the predecessor software. Recently, the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
4
Grokster, Ltd. (“MGM”), decided that the creators of software that invited illegal downloading could be held secondarily liable for their
users’ infringements; such liability would attach if the creators encouraged the infringement in violation of a version of the “induce-
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1
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770
(2005). The Court explains the nuances of the Grokster and Streamcast technology.
Id. Essentially, the programs differ from their older counterparts in that the manufacturers’ software allows computer users to share and transfer files “directly with
each other, not through central servers.” Id. This eliminates expensive storage
space, allows for faster transfers and communications, and decreases the risk of security breaches or harmful glitches. Id.
2
Id. at 2772–73.
3
Benny Evangelista, Music File-Sharing Case Before High Court; Ruling Could Have
Major Effect on Future of Entertainment Industry, Consumer Rights, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28,
2005, at A1 (To date, the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) has
sued 9900 people individually for downloading music; the RIAA began filing individual suits in September, 2003.).
4
MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
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ment” rule often utilized in patent infringement cases. This decision
6
was seen as a huge victory for the recording industry, although some
commentators question whether this opinion was, indeed, harmful to
makers of software, or whether the programmers will simply bounce
7
back with another tide of new technology.
It is a well-established notion that technology and copyright pro8
tection butt heads like rams vying for common territory. As a result,
the MGM Court hinders innovation and, simultaneously, threatens to
9
constrain First Amendment free speech rights of software producers,
marketers, and advertisers, by favoring copyright over technological
10
innovation.
5

Id.
Matthew Ingram, Entertainment Industry Victory May Be Hollow, N.Z. HERALD, July
5, 2005 (noting that “the entertainment industry got what it clearly felt was a victory
in its fight against illegal downloading of music and movies”); see also Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Statement on MGM v. Grokster Supreme Court Ruling, June 27, 2005, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/062705.asp (“This decision lays the groundwork for the dawn of a new day—an opportunity that will bring
the entertainment and technology communities even closer together, with music
fans reaping the rewards.”).
7
Stephen Kiehl, Abigail Tucker & Sam Sessa, Is Ruling End of File-Sharing? Industry Hopes So, But Users Say Free Music Will Never Die, BALT. SUN, June 29, 2005, at A1
(“As quickly as authorities find ways to curtail the free downloading of music, consumers find ways around them.”). Websites and programs exist that authorities do
not know about yet and new technology is developing constantly. Id.; see also Jon
Pareles, The Court Ruled, So Enter The Geeks, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at E1. Software
writers simply established
independent, ad-free networks or, like Bittorrent, facilitated multiple individual connections. The court’s decision may torpedo the
parasitical, ad-pumping services like Grokster, Kazaa and Morpheus,
but no one’s going to miss them much. There are plenty of geek alternatives that were devised not as business startups, but for the programmers’ satisfaction and the users’ sense of connection.
Id.
8
Professor Lawrence Lessig of Stanford University Law School describes this
conflict:
It is the duty of policy makers . . . to assure that the changes they create, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology,
are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for innovation and change. In the context of laws regulating speech—which include, obviously, copyright law—that duty is even stronger. When the
industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress
to respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers
should be especially wary of the request. It is always a bad deal for the
government to get into the business of regulating speech markets.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 128 (2004), available at http://www.freeculture.cc/freeculture.pdf.
9
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech . . . .”).
10
See infra Part III.
6
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Copyright law also often comes into conflict with the First
11
Amendment. The MGM Court has ruled in favor of copyright and
has adopted the inducement rule as its flimsy plywood barrier to protect free speech from the onslaught of the copyright doctrine. Now,
due to new concerns for free speech created by MGM, courts must
take First Amendment values into careful consideration before
blindly applying the MGM Court’s inducement rule. This Comment
suggests that courts consider a more speech-protective interpretation
of the inducement rule in light of the concrete wall of protection af12
forded to speech via the incitement standard. This solution arises
from an analysis comparing the MGM decision and its potential free
speech limitations to media incitement cases that took a more estab13
lished route through a similar free speech labyrinth.
This Comment, however, is about more than just the MGM decision. It scrutinizes secondary liability for expression using MGM as a
vehicle for analysis. This Comment does not suggest that the solution
to the impending free speech problem is to wholly replace the MGM
Court’s inducement standard or to rewrite or abandon the Court’s
opinion. It does suggest, however, that courts faced with similar disputes in the future should use a stricter, more speech-sensitive interpretation of the inducement standard that, for guidance, hearkens
more to the expression-protective incitement test than the patent in14
ducement rule. Courts should shift toward a more incitement-like
interpretation of inducement because of the First Amendment rights
currently endangered by the MGM Court’s importation of a secondary liability standard that properly applies to cases about things (i.e.,
patented inventions) but not to cases about expression (i.e., copyrighted materials, advertisements, etc.). Using incitement as a base
will establish a firmer groundwork for secondary liability in the expression context.
Part I of this Comment provides a general overview of the situation at hand, with Part I.A explaining the MGM case, its holding, and

11
Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1280–81 (2003) (criticizing judicial rejection of the conflict between the First Amendment and copyright, and reiterating the presence of such a
conflict and its ramifications).
12
The incitement test states that “the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
13
See infra Part II.B.
14
See infra Part II.B.
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its version of the inducement rule. Part I.B lays out the bizarre landscape of secondary liability as well as the highly ambiguous conduct
of the MGM manufacturers and downloaders. This section suggests
that the inducement rule is unworkable and should be clarified and
refined because it provides so little guidance. Part I.B.1 explains the
inducement rule’s lack of clarity in the context of disclaimers and
analyzes problems that inducement would create when applied to
such speech. Part I.B.2 further analyzes the inducement test’s ambiguity based on the diversity of concurrences found in the MGM decision, itself. Part II asks how courts can elucidate the murky inducement standard, with Part II.A dismissing the patent context as a
means of clarification. Part II.B, however, determines that media incitement cases clarify the standard because these cases involve secondary liability based on expression, just like MGM. This section will
summarize the results of several landmark cases involving incitement
suits against the media for violent action on the part of its consumers,
thus establishing a basis of comparison to MGM in the context of secondary liability for expression. This section ultimately concludes that
the manufacturers’ speech in MGM would not pass incitement-level
scrutiny and would thus be deemed protected speech. Part III notes
that copyright law must acknowledge the First Amendment, and thus
provides a discussion regarding the differences between inducement
and incitement and their suitability to different types of intellectual
property. It concludes that since the speech at issue in MGM is more
closely related to the copyrightable expression seen in the “violent
media” cases, a test akin to incitement is more appropriate because,
unlike the patent inducement test, it inherently accounts for speechspecific contingencies.
This Comment ultimately finds that file-sharing secondary liability cases should be interpreted in light of the incitement standard, as
incitement is merely a version of inducement that is more speechprotective and more appropriately aimed at expression. The goal is
to preserve First Amendment free speech rights in the everburgeoning P2P software industry. The solution is not to rewrite the
MGM decision, but to clarify the standard with guidance from the incitement test, the conflict between copyright and free speech, and
the various policy issues at stake. The aim of this Comment is neither
to express an opinion on the propriety of illegal downloading nor to
take either the downloaders’ or industries’ sides on that main issue.
The focus is on free speech concerns and the analytical problems involved in the Court’s adoption of a particular rule.
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AN OVERVIEW: SETTING THE TONE

A. The MGM Decision and the Inducement Standard: A Case and Its
Rule
In MGM, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that
P2P software manufacturers (“manufacturers”) could be held secondarily liable for their users’ infringement if they actively induced or
“encouraged” the infringement through “clear expression or other
15
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.” The manufacturers
of the Grokster and Streamcast software distributed free programs
which allowed users to share digital media files through P2P networks
(which communicate computer-to-computer, unlike older programs,
16
Although
such as Napster, which linked up to a central server).
some of the material traded and downloaded on the manufacturers’
software were in the public domain (such as plays by Shakespeare) or
were available through consent of the copyright owners, the Court
noted that the vast majority of the downloads were of copyrighted
materials posted without the consent of the owners, thus constituting
17
copyright infringement by the users. The manufacturers did not
contest their awareness that their users utilized the programs “primarily to download copyrighted files”; they knew about these in-

15

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770
(2005) (“We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties.”). The case against Grokster appears to have been settled. Kevin Allison, The
Battle for Grokster Leaves a War to Be Won DIGITAL MUSIC: With the File-Sharing Company
Out of Action, Some in the Record Business Are Upbeat. But, Writes Kevin Allison, There is
Trouble Ahead, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 20, 2005, at 12 (“In November, the music
industry won a big scalp after Grokster, the peer-to-peer file-sharing service, agreed
to shut down as part of a legal settlement.”).
16
MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
17
Id. at 2772. This proposition is disputed in the manufacturers’ amicus brief.
Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 4, MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/mgm/lunney-law-profs.pdf [hereinafter
“Lunney Amicus Brief”] (“Applying the equitable rule of reason approach to fair use
that this Court established for private copying in Sony Corp., the undersigned Amici
would respectfully suggest that much of the unauthorized sharing of copyrighted
works through P2P networks constitute a fair and hence noninfringing use.”). Lunney notes that unauthorized P2P file sharing replaced legitimate market purchases in
“less than ten percent of the P2P file sharing at issue. As for the remaining ninety
percent, the petitioners have altogether failed to prove that this type of P2P file sharing substitutes for authorized access or is otherwise unfair.” Id. at 24.
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fringements from user e-mails asking for guidance regarding the play18
ing of copyrighted material.
From their inception, the Court noted, Grokster and Streamcast
were intended to be used to download copyrighted works, and their
19
creators made this intent known and encouraged infringement.
The manufacturers marketed their programs directly to former Napster users, promoting their products as Napster alternatives in order
to recapture a horde of technophiles wandering aimlessly in a desert
20
devoid of free downloads. Grokster even sent a newsletter to users
which touted “its ability to provide particular, popular copyrighted
21
The Court noted that both manufacturers’ business
materials.”
models indicated their objective to encourage copyright infringement: since the software was free, income would come from selling
advertising space which was worth much more as the user base increased, suggesting that “volume is a function of free access to copy22
righted work.”
Also, neither service blocked infringers nor “filter[ed] copyrighted material,” and both turned away companies that
23
solicited monitoring services to try to catch infringers.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the manufacturers’ summary judgment motions and
held that Grokster and Streamcast were not secondarily liable be-

18
19

MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2772.
Id.
Grokster and StreamCast are not, however, merely passive recipients
of information about infringing use. The record is replete with evidence that from the moment Grokster and StreamCast began to distribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the objective that
recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage infringement.

Id.
20

Id. at 2772–73. The Court looked to internal company documents and press
kits sent to potential advertisers that indicated Streamcast was “similar to what Napster was” and would be “positioned to capture the flood of their 32 million users that
will be actively looking for an alternative.” Id. at 2773. Streamcast also created promotional marketing materials to market itself as a Napster alternative (which may or
may not have been publicly released—a factor the Court disregarded due to the materials’ reflection of Streamcast’s intent). Id. The materials contained statements
such as “Napster Inc. has announced that it will soon begin charging you a fee.
That’s if the courts don’t order it to shut down first. What will you do to get around
it?” and “when the lights went off at Napster . . . where did the users go?” MGM, 125
S. Ct. at 2773. Grokster’s name was an apparent Napster spin-off, and its makers
used digital codes to direct search engine inquiries on “free filesharing” to Grokster’s
website. Id.
21
Id. at 2774.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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cause use of their software “did not provide the distributors with ac24
tual knowledge of specific acts of infringement.” The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing Sony Corp. of
25
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in holding that “distribution of a
commercial product capable of substantial noninfringing uses could
not give rise to contributory liability for infringement unless the distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement
26
and failed to act on that knowledge.” The Ninth Circuit essentially
held that there was no liability because the manufacturers’ software
used no central server and the makers did not engage in any other
27
affirmative activities aside from providing the software.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit and held that the appellate court had misap28
plied the Sony rule. The Ninth Circuit’s actual knowledge standard
was excessively broad, thus extending Sony too far because Sony did
29
not “displace other theories of secondary liability.” Therefore, the
Court declined to further analyze Sony and the copyright owners’
knowledge theory because “nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore
evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never
meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the
30
common law.” The Court noted that “where evidence goes beyond

24

Id.
464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (holding that VCRs were “capable of substantial noninfringing uses” and therefore the manufacturer could not be held secondarily liable
based solely on its distribution). The MGM Court notes that this standard is borrowed from patent law’s “staple article of commerce” doctrine which states that “distribution of a component of a patented device will not violate the patent if it is suitable for use in other ways.” MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2777 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)
(2000) and Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 485
(1964)). The author is aware that the Sony Court integrated a patent standard into
copyright law and that this decision has stood the test of time. That said, this Comment later distinguishes patent and copyright law for the purpose of criticizing the
patent inducement rule as applied in a copyright context. See infra Part III. This
Comment distinguishes the Sony scenario and does not question the adoption of a
patent doctrine in that case. Such an integration as seen in Sony did not raise any
noteworthy First Amendment issues because commercial speech (i.e. advertisements
and marketing plans) was not affected by the Court’s holding. Unlike in MGM, the
copyright holders in Sony claimed liability solely due to the distribution of a product,
not due to the underlying speech that facilitated the distribution. See Sony, 464 U.S. at
419. Thus, the two scenarios are fundamentally different, and the author does not
suggest that the Sony rule is misguided merely because it also hearkens to patent law.
26
MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2775.
27
Id. at 2774–75.
28
Id. at 2778.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 2779.
25
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a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting
31
infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability.”
Rather than relying solely on Sony, the Court complemented the
staple-article rule by adopting its own interpretation of the induce32
ment standard from patent law: “one who distributes a device with
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third par33
ties.” In adopting this standard, the Court noted that the inducement rule “premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and
conduct,” rather than mere knowledge of the product’s potential to
infringe, actual infringing uses, or steps taken in the normal course
34
of business or product distribution, such as technical support.
Thus, the Court opined that the inducement test “does nothing to
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a
35
lawful promise.”
The Court found the required unlawful objective fairly easily,
looking to the following elements to reach its conclusion:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The manufacturers’ advertisements to former Napster users;
Offerings of Napster-like software with similar names and similar functions;
Grokster’s newsletter touting its ability to download copyrighted music;
Grokster’s diversion of P2P file-sharing search engine queries
to its own website;
Streamcast’s (as yet unpublished) advertising campaigns aimed
at former Napster users;
Both companies’ technical assistance to users in finding copyrighted material; and
Both companies’ refusal to filter shared copyrighted material. 36

The “unlawful objective [was] unmistakable” in light of concrete evidence of mass copyright infringement by users, and the Court ulti-

31
32

Id.
See infra Part II.A and note 109 for a full explanation of the rule and its nu-

ances.
33
34
35
36

MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2780–81.
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mately found that the Ninth Circuit’s grant of summary judgment was
37
erroneous.
The central focus of the MGM decision and of this Comment is,
of course, the inducement standard and its possible ramifications.
Logically, the rule itself requires a bit more clarification than what
was stated above. The inducement rule, in the context of patent law,
has been codified, and states that “whoever actively induces in38
fringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” The inducement standard, as articulated by the Court in MGM, is as follows:
Evidence of “active steps . . . taken to encourage direct infringement,” such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to
engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the
product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was
encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when
a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some
39
lawful use.

Inducement, in terms of patent infringement, will be explained more
40
below.
B. The Secondary Liability Landscape and Inducement’s Road to
Nowhere
This Comment is not simply about the MGM case. It encompasses the more general idea that secondary and contributory liability, as concepts, are a bit strange, especially because they seem to apply in differing degrees to issues as life-threatening as gun control or
41
as comparatively miniscule as copyright protection. It seems odd
that copyright holders so badly want to hold technological innovators—whose creations are capable of copyright infringement—
secondarily liable for users’ infringements when, analogously, those
injured by firearms are rarely ever able to hold gun manufacturers li42
able for personal injuries suffered as the result of a gunshot. Apparently the unbearable loss of human life and the life-shattering re37

Id. at 2782.
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000).
39
MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 (internal citations omitted).
40
See infra Part II.A.
41
See Alfred C. Yen, A Personal Injury Law Perspective on Copyright in an Internet Age, 52 Hastings L.J. 929, 931 (2001) (“[I]f [measures desired by copyright holders] seem more drastic than those we are willing to accept when guarding against serious physical injury or death [in personal injury or gun control law], then perhaps
recent efforts to expand copyright protection have gone too far.”).
42
Id. at 934 (noting that “plaintiffs injured by misuse of guns or alcohol have
practically no chance of recovering from gun or alcohol manufacturers”).
38
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sults of serious physical injury are not reasons enough to push courts
and legislatures to ban possession of guns. So how can copyright
holders justify secondary liability for copyright infringement when
the infringement “inflicts intangible economic injuries, and not the
physical personal injuries that justify the use of enterprise liability in
43
tort law”? Indeed, “the use of enterprise liability to protect copyrights seems even stranger” when we compare real, physical injuries
44
with mere economic harm.
In tort law, “doctrines of defect, proximate cause, and assumption of risk . . . limit the reach of enterprise liability,” making it nearly
45
impossible for injured plaintiffs to recover from gun manufacturers.
46
It seems logical, then, that fair use, the free speech safety valve analogue in copyright law, would lead to the same conclusion—the inability to impute secondary liability for copyright infringement to
manufacturers like Grokster or Streamcast. The Supreme Court of
the United States has even emphasized that fair use acts as a safety
47
valve when copyright and the First Amendment clash. Fair use in
the MGM context would likely involve the downloading of public
domain works, the downloading of copyrighted works with the con48
sent of the owners, non-commercial uses of the works, or commercial uses lacking a significant effect on the market for a particular
49
copyrighted work.

43

Id.
Id.
45
Id. at 933.
46
Analysis of four non-exclusive factors determines whether a use is fair: “(1) the
purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; (4)
the effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1985).
47
Recent case law supports this proposition:
[T]he “fair use” defense allows the public to use not only facts and
ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances. Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107, the defense provides:
“The fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . . , for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.” The fair use
defense affords considerable “latitude for scholarship and comment,”
. . . and even for parody . . . .
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
48
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772
(2005).
49
See supra notes 46–47.
44
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As seen in MGM, however, the scope of fair use and the nature
50
of the downloaded works were highly contested. The conduct at issue was extremely ambiguous; there was no way for experts, much less
the Court, to determine whether each individual download was fair
51
or infringing; this confusion muddied the waters even further as to
the appropriateness of secondary liability for expression on the part
of the manufacturers. Despite a lack of definitive evidence showing
52
that the users’ downloads were not fair, and despite the presence of
53
evidence suggesting that a majority of the uses were fair, the Court
still found that the software manufacturers could be secondarily liable via inducement—despite the fair use safety valve—based on the
quantity of files downloaded and the intent and actions of the manu54
facturers.
As strange as the concept of secondary liability may be in the expression context, especially in MGM, it is not altogether invalid.
There are situations where the rule could be legitimately applied in
order to protect the public from physical harm. As seen in Rice v.
55
Paladin Enterprises, Inc., expression can sometimes, though very rarely,
lose its First Amendment protection when it incites violence on the
56
part of its recipient. Eugene Volokh, a law professor at UCLA Law
School, addresses other limited situations where secondary liability
for expression may be proper, such as when a publication teaches
57
Volokh qualifies these cirreaders how to make nuclear bombs.
cumstances with the idea that such liability should only be imputed
50

MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2772 (“MGM commissioned a statistician to conduct a systematic search, and his study showed that nearly 90% of the [available] files . . . were
copyrighted works. [Manufacturers] dispute this figure . . . arguing that free copying
even of copyrighted works may be authorized . . . [and] potential noninfringing uses
of their software are significant in kind . . . .”).
51
Id. (“[T]he parties’ anecdotal and statistical evidence entered thus far to show
the content available on the FastTrack and Gnutella networks does not say much
about which files are actually downloaded by users, and no one can say how often the
software is used to obtain copies of unprotected material.”).
52
Id. at 2788–89 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer observes that the ten
percent of potentially noninfringing files offered on Grokster and Streamcast was
approximately the same percentage found to be fair in the Sony case. Id. He also
noted that MGM “has offered no evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment
that could plausibly demonstrate a significant quantitative difference” to counter the
fair use argument. Id. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring).
53
Lunney Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 22–26.
54
MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2772.
55
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (instruction manual on contract killing lost its
First Amendment protection because it incited and aided and abetted a grisly triple
homicide).
56
Id. at 250; see infra Part II.B and notes 185–87.
57
Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2005).
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based on a suggested rule that would narrow the circumstances in
58
which expression would lose its First Amendment protection.
The ultimate question, then, is: why extend secondary liability to
manufacturers like Grokster and Streamcast? Copyright infringement is not a matter of life or death, and as seen above (and as will be
seen below), expression rarely loses its protection even when situations do involve life or death. This question begs courts to clarify the
inducement rule adopted by the MGM Court in order to align secondary liability jurisprudence with the current trend in analogous areas
of the law, and to afford more First Amendment protection to speakers in situations similar to MGM. In order to decide how to refine
and clarify the rule, however, we must first analyze why it is unworkable, and therefore leads future courts on a winding dirt road to nowhere.
1.

The Disclaimer Dilemma: A Paradox

One problem courts will encounter in strictly applying the MGM
inducement standard is how to treat disclaimers. Can a speaker circumvent the inducement rule simply by placing a disclaimer on a
product, advertisement, or marketing scheme? It seems that there
are two potential outcomes in the disclaimer situation, both of which
expose the inducement standard as an imprecise choice as the governing rule in these situations.
Outcome One: What if the makers of Grokster and Streamcast
had inserted a warning stating “Do not use this product to infringe
copyrighted material” or “Warning, this product has the potential to
infringe copyrighted material. Grokster/Streamcast does not sanction this type of use and encourages its customers to use the software
only in a legal capacity”? This type of warning may look good on its
face. Potentially, these speakers could avoid liability under the inducement rule because they did the opposite of what the rule prohibits—actively encouraging infringement. Such disclaimers would be
used to discourage illegal use. This first outcome allows speakers to
avoid the inducement rule rather easily just by adding a few words to
58

Volokh notes that
crime-facilitating speech ought to be constitutionally protected unless
(1) it’s said to a person or a small group of people when the speaker
knows these few listeners are likely to use the information for criminal
purposes, (2) it’s within one of the few classes of speech that has almost
no noncriminal value, or (3) it can cause extraordinarily serious harm
(on the order of a nuclear attack or a plague) even when it’s also valuable for lawful purposes.
Id. at 1106.
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their advertisements or on the packaging their products. Under
these circumstances, the inducement standard will be seen as extremely weak and easy to avoid altogether. There would not be much
left of the MGM decision in the universe of this outcome.
Volokh addresses this issue in his article about speech that facili59
tates criminal activities. The author notes first that restrictions on
advertisements that promote “improper uses of a work burden lawful
uses only slightly, because the same material could be distributed if it
weren’t billed as promoting illegal uses,” and such restrictions could
60
even decrease illegal use. Volokh notes, however, that if courts focus on the advertising or marketing of speech that has potential illegal uses, the speakers could “just slightly change their speech so that
it doesn’t look like an overt appeal to illegal users” and the message
“could still be communicated if it’s not presented in a way that
61
stresses the illegal uses.”
Outcome Two: Could such a disclaimer as mentioned above
constitute inducement in and of itself? It is possible that the mere
mention of the potential for illegal use, especially a tempting use that
leads to free music and movies, could be considered an inducement
to infringe copyright. This second outcome would lead to an inducement standard stretched far beyond its reasonable boundaries.
The expansiveness of the rule in this outcome would mean that no
precautions the speaker took could prevent inducement liability because the speaker’s acts of prevention would themselves be inducements even if the speaker honestly is trying to prevent and discourage
illegal use of its product. In this universe, the inducement rule would
not only infringe upon free speech rights in advertisements, but it
would reach so far as to infringe upon free speech rights in disclaimers
in advertisements. This outcome allows too much leeway in an already broad standard, and allows the inducement rule to spill over its
levees.
Donald S. Chisum, in his treatise on patent law, has even ad62
His treatise notes that “[e]ven an express
dressed this dilemma.
warning to customers against infringing use will not preclude liability
63
if under the circumstances the warning invites such use.”
This
59

Id. at 1200.
Id.
61
Id. at 1201. Volokh’s examples of this phenomenon include “term-paper Web
sites” which “already present themselves as offering mere ‘example essays,’ and say
things like ‘the papers contained within our web site are for research purposes
only!’” Id.
62
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04(4)(f) (2005).
63
Id.
60
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quandary could potentially plague inducement standard jurisprudence, especially as applied to such amorphous concepts as creative
and expressive speech, whether artistic, political, or commercial.
To put this paradox in a context close to that of MGM, it is use64
ful to look at the “Hear Your Music Anywhere” Project (“Hymn”).
Hymn is a software provider that allows Apple iTunes users to “free”
their purchased music downloads “from their DRM restrictions with
65
no loss of sound quality.” By converting these music files away from
their current file format, users would be able to play the songs outside of the iTunes software, which is where the DRM file format re66
stricts them. The program is used to decrypt songs so they can be
played through other software, on other operating systems, and on
67
more computers. It is also used to “make archival backups of your
68
music” to use on a portable MP3 player other than an iPod.
The website states that another purpose of the software is to
“demonstrate your belief in the principles of fair-use under copyright
69
law.” Software such as Hymn’s could be viewed as similar to that of
Grokster and Streamcast in that it may have potential noninfringing
70
uses such as creating archival backups, but could still be used for
secondary copyright infringement that is arguably encouraged by the
71
maker. Were Hymn to place a disclaimer on its website or in the
software license agreement that read “This software is for fair use
only,” would they be out of harm’s way? Based on the present interpretation of the inducement standard, copyright owners likely would

64
Hear Your Music Anywhere, http://www.hymn-project.org (last visited Apr. 5,
2007).
65
Id. (“DRM” refers to the file format in which downloaded iTunes songs are delivered).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 471–72 (2004)
(“Some consumptive use copying is privileged, such as in-home copying of free
broadcast television for later viewing, copying [certain] sound recordings . . . and
making backup copies of computer programs.”). Besek also notes that the “Audio
Home Recording Act (“AHRA”) contains a privilege to make analog and certain digital copies of musical recordings” in some circumstances. Id. at 472.
71
Copyright owners would claim violations of their exclusive rights under the
copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). They would most likely sue for contributory infringement of their right of reproduction under § 106(1) or digital performance rights under § 106(6). They could also argue that “due to its narrow definitions, works copied by means of computers do not qualify for the AHRA privilege.”
Besek, supra note 70, at 472.
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argue for an expansive reading of the inducement rule, making this
disclaimer an inducement in and of itself. Alternatively, if a court decided that this disclaimer was enough to satisfy MGM, there would
not be much left of the rule, as this disclaimer “exemption” would
swallow the MGM rule whole.
Incitement, however, does not present this disclaimer problem,
nor does it cause confusion on the part of the speaker as to whether
the disclaimer will save them or damn them in the end. In several of
72
the “violent media” incitement cases, disclaimers have been taken
into the analysis as a significant factor weighing against incitement li73
ability on the part of a media speaker. In other cases, the absence
of a disclaimer has been deemed inconsequential, as the expression
still failed the incitement standard, and such a warning was not even
74
required.
75
In Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., for example, Hustler Magazine placed an explicit and noticeable disclaimer before its article on
dangerous sexual practices that stated that the magazine “emphasizes
the often-fatal dangers of the practice of ‘auto-erotic asphyxia,’ and
recommends that readers seeking unique forms of sexual release DO
NOT ATTEMPT this method. The facts are presented here solely for
76
an educational purpose.” The article also graphically depicted the
deadly outcomes of some unfortunate experiments in the sexual
77
practice detailed therein. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found that Hustler magazine’s article had not incited a young man’s accidental suicide after reading the article, and
gave significant weight to the disclaimer and the graphic warnings of
78
possible accidents.
79
The plaintiff in Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp. was the
father of a murder victim who was killed by members of a gang after a
showing of the movie The Warriors, a fictional portrayal of gang vio80
lence in New York City. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
movie theater and production companies failed to “warn the exhibitors of the film and those responsible for the safety of the public” and

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

See infra Part II.B.
See infra notes 75–78.
See infra notes 79–88.
814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1018–19.
Id. at 1023.
536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989).
Id. at 1068.

SHOLDERFINAL

814

4/12/2007 12:01:04 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:799

“to take reasonable steps to protect [people] at or near the theater”
81
showing the movie. Essentially, the plaintiff complained that Paramount and the theater should be liable for the movie’s supposed incitement to violence because they failed to place a disclaimer before
the movie or to warn those responsible for exhibiting the movie and
82
This count was dismissed on summary judgkeeping the peace.
83
ment. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that a
“fatal assault occurring miles from the theater as a matter of law
could not be attributed to a failure to” protect those near the theater
or a failure on the part of Paramount or the theater owners to warn
84
anyone.
85
Similarly, in Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., a failure to
warn claim did not hold water with a California appellate court when
the parents of a young rape victim alleged that a television movie depicting a violent rape scene incited a group of youths to attack their
86
daughter. The parents claimed the film was “particularly likely to
cause imitation and that NBC televised the film without proper warn87
ing in an effort to obtain the largest possible viewing audience.”
The movie ultimately failed the incitement test despite the absence of
88
a disclaimer before the movie.
Were future courts to interpret the inducement test for contributory copyright infringement in light of incitement, they would
be able to avoid the messy issue of disclaimers altogether, and possibly avoid future circuit splits. Inducement leaves the door wide open
for a flood of litigation solely on the issue of the inducing (or noninducing) nature of disclaimers. By utilizing a stricter interpretation
of the rule and reflecting on and citing to the “violent media” cases,
future courts can avoid this potential disclaimer disarray. Disclaimers
are practically a non-issue in the “violent media” cases, as they are either helpful to the speaker or are unnecessary. This simplification
will make MGM-type jurisprudence much tidier. If the inducement
standard is perpetuated as it stands, litigation would increase, and
cases would become very convoluted.

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at 1072 (alteration in original).
Id. at 1068.
Id. at 1072.
Id.
178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 890–91.
Id. at 891.
Id. at 892.
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Furthermore, either outcome of the continued use of the present inducement rule mentioned in the context of the two situations
at the beginning of this section would constitute a legal mockery
when it comes to disclaimers. If inducement could be circumvented
simply by using a disclaimer, MGM would be rendered meaningless.
Still, if disclaimers themselves were found to be inducing, speakers
would be at a loss for simple methods of self-preservation. Innovation, as well as speech, would most certainly be chilled to the bone.
Because the present interpretation of the inducement standard poses
a lose-lose situation in the MGM context, courts should adopt a test
that hearkens to incitement for guidance.
2.

Diversity of Concurrences in MGM: Leaning Toward
Justice Breyer’s Opinion

Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg wrote the concurring opinions in MGM. Each justice took a different view on the case, and
their disagreement is yet another indication that the inducement
standard is blurry to the point of uselessness. Despite MGM being a
unanimous decision, a diversity of concurrences is suggestive of an
unclear rule.
89
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in MGM calls for an unchanged view of the Sony rule, which would better protect technology
and, in turn, would better protect the speakers behind the technol90
Although Justice Breyer agreed with the Court’s conclusion
ogy.
and adoption of the inducement standard, he believed that Grokster
and Streamcast had proved to the Ninth Circuit that their software
91
was “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.” Therefore, Justice
Breyer concluded that the stricter version of the Sony test suggested
92
93
by Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence was unnecessary. Justice Ginsburg urged that the evidence proffered by Grokster and Streamcast
was insufficient to satisfy the Sony rule regarding substantial nonin-

89
Justice Breyer has significant experience in copyright and is presumably the
resident expert on the Supreme Court in these matters. See Frank Pasquale, Breaking
the Vicious Circularity: Sony’s Contribution to the Fair Use Doctrine, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
777, 810 (2005) (“Although Justice Breyer has done much to try to rationalize copyright law in his scholarship and opinions in copyright disputes, his work in administrative law most directly inspires my work on the topic.”).
90
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2796
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
91
Id. at 2787–88 (Breyer, J., concurring).
92
Id. at 2783–86 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
93
Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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94

fringing uses.
She would require a stricter reading of the Sony
rule—one that requires more evidence and more concrete examples
of noninfringing uses before deciding whether a product is capable
95
of substantial noninfringing uses.
Justice Breyer noted, however, that in Sony, nine percent of uses
of the VCR were found to be noninfringing and therefore substantial;
the manufacturers in MGM had shown that approximately ten per96
cent of the uses of their software were noninfringing. Justice Breyer
concluded that manufacturers’ evidence of consenting artists, free
electronic books, public domain material, and “licensed music videos
and movie segments” provided sufficient proof of substantial nonin97
fringing use in light of the Sony holding. He also emphasized that
the Sony Court’s use of the word “capable” in its rule on noninfringing uses inferred a forward-looking perspective; thus it would be possible to foresee many future noninfringing uses that either were up98
and-coming or had not even come to life yet.
For three reasons, Justice Breyer ultimately concluded that a
99
stricter reading of Sony was unnecessary. First, he noted that the
Sony rule is technology-protecting in that it is clear as to what manufacturers can and cannot do; it is a deliberately difficult standard and
is “forward looking” because it anticipates technological evolution
100
and allows leeway for such innovation.
Second, the Justice noted that a stricter interpretation, asking
for a heavier evidentiary burden on the part of a defendant, would
“undercut the protection that Sony now offers” by forcing innovators
to provide extensive information on noninfringing uses—yet innovators would still face “legal uncertainty” as to whether their new tech101
nology would be protected.
The uncertainty would cause unpredictable results in courts employing this extremely fact-sensitive
analysis, and could result in less ambition to create, thus chilling in102
novation in general.
94

Id. at 2785–86 (Ginsburg, J. concurring).
Id. at 2786 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
96
MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2788–89 (Breyer, J., concurring).
97
Id. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring).
98
Id. at 2789–91 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that up-and-coming uses include research, historical recordings, digital photo swapping, shareware swapping,
licensed media file sharing, news broadcasts, and independently-created media file
sharing); see supra note 25 for an explanation of the Sony rule.
99
MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
100
Id. at 2791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
101
Id. at 2792–93 (Breyer, J., concurring).
102
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
95
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Third, Justice Breyer noted that although a stricter Sony rule
would benefit copyright owners, it was not clear that this benefit
103
would outweigh possible chills on technology.
The Justice concluded that a stricter rule may be unnecessary and dangerous because, presently, any evidence of extreme harm to copyright owners is
104
Justice Breyer pointed out that the statistics regarding
uncertain.
P2P software’s diminuation of creative works were sparse, and proof
105
of loss of entertainment industry revenue was unclear.
Furthermore, owners of copyrights have viable alternatives: they can sue for
direct infringement, institute new technological innovations to further protect their works, turn a profit via legal downloading services,
106
or turn to the legislature for a change in the law.
Justice Breyer’s concurrence is the most reasonable interpretation of both Sony and MGM in light of the free speech issues mentioned in this Comment. His position is technology-friendly and innovation-protective and calls for no change in the Sony rule, while still
107
Justice Breyer’s technologyallowing for liability via inducement.
protective view analogizes perfectly to speech in the context of this
Comment. Were future courts to adopt Justice Ginsburg’s stricter
application of the Sony rule, not only would P2P software be inhib-

103

Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
105
MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2793–94 (Breyer, J., concurring). “Unauthorized copying
likely diminishes industry revenue, though it is not clear by how much.” Id. at 2794
(Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer compares the results of studies on industry
revenue. Compare Stan Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate the Recording Industry? The Evidence So Far, June 2003, at 2, http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/
intprop/records.pdf (“My conclusions, in a nutshell, are that MP3 downloading does
appear to be causing harm. No other explanations that have been put forward seem
to be able to explain the decline in sales that have occurred since 1999.”), with Felix
Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical
Analysis, Mar. 2004, at 24, http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_
March2004.pdf (“We find that file sharing has no statistically significant effect on
purchases of the average album in our sample.”). Justice Breyer also notes that the
“extent to which related production has actually and resultingly declined remains
uncertain, though there is good reason to believe that the decline, if any, is not substantial.” MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring). To support this proposition he cites Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 351–52 (2004), which
explains that “[m]uch of the actual flow of revenue to artists—from performances
and other sources—is stable even assuming a complete displacement of the CD market by [P2P] distribution . . . it would be silly to think that music . . . will cease to be
in our world [because of illegal file swapping].” MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
106
Id. at 2794–96 (Breyer, J., concurring).
107
Id. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104

SHOLDERFINAL

818

4/12/2007 12:01:04 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:799

ited, but the accompanying speech in advertisements and marketing
schemes would be similarly stymied.
If courts were to interpret Sony more strictly, they would inherently have to view inducement more broadly. Logically, if a court is
going to require more proof to show that a product is capable of substantial noninfringing uses, it will likely require less proof to show that
the speech advocating those uses was unprotected under the First
Amendment. Under Justice Breyer’s approach, however, the Sony
rule would remain the same—difficult to satisfy yet broad and protective of innovation. Courts could accordingly tighten inducement in
108
light of the incitement cases mentioned below in order to grant the
speech accompanying the technology as much deference and protection as Sony grants to the innovation itself.
II. HOW DO WE CLARIFY THE INDUCEMENT STANDARD?
A. The Patent Cases: No Help Here
The MGM Court’s imported inducement rule was taken from
many cases involving secondary infringement of patents, each of
109
which placed its own spin on the rule.
However, an analysis of the
rule in the patent law context does nothing to clarify the standard for
purposes of applying it in cases involving secondary liability for expression.
Chisum explains that “a person infringes by actively and knowingly aiding and abetting another’s direct infringement of the pat110
ent.”
Chisum notes that in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb,
111
Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held

108

See infra Part II.B.
See generally MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp.,
No. 04-1396, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17956, at *21, *25–*27 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 22, 2005)
(technical support presentations and technical support through e-mail about patented material could be inducement); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (published articles about patented
material could be inducing); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d
1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (possible inducement by supplying customers with the
patented product and instructions on how to use it); Water Tech. Corp. v. Calco,
Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (inducement liability where one “actively
and knowingly aid[s] and abet[s] another’s direct infringement”); Fromberg, Inc. v.
Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 412–13 (5th Cir. 1963) (inducement when sales staff demonstrated infringing uses); R.W. Sims v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1198, 1217
(E.D. Pa. 1978), rev’d and vacated, 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979) (inducement in promotional films and brochures depicting use of patented device).
110
CHISUM, supra note 62, § 17.04.
111
909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
109
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that “proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active induce112
Chisum, however, observes that a Virginia district court in
ment.”
113
Hauni Werke Koerber & Co. v. Molins, Ltd., held just the opposite,
finding that specific intent was unnecessary to find active induce114
ment. Chisum concludes that commentators have generally agreed
that the mens rea requirement for inducement is unclear, at best,
115
and that case law varies to a great degree. Based on its “affirmative
intent that the product be used to infringe” language, the MGM
Court’s take on mens rea seems to be one of an intent require116
This language should not be taken as gospel, however, conment.
sidering the MGM Court adopted the inducement rule in the wake of
the diversity of mens rea requirements noted in the previous patent
cases mentioned above.
According to Chisum, actions that can constitute inducement in
a patent context include licensing, indemnification, repair and maintenance, design, purchase of product, instruction, and advertising,
117
and publication.
Of most concern here, of course, is “instruction
and advertising,” which has the most obvious First Amendment con118
Chisum explains that
notations, especially in the MGM context.
“instruction and advertising” can induce infringement “where a defendant selling products capable of either innocent or infringing use
provides through labels, advertising or other sales methods instruc119
tions and directions as to the infringing use.” The treatise explains
this phenomenon primarily in the context of complex medical tech120
nology cases that are beyond the scope of this Comment.
This broad articulation of the inducement standard, combined
with the MGM Court’s statement of the rule, and the diverse patent
inducement cases, show how heterogeneous and unclear the inducement rule is. As an overall proposition, the broad “active steps”
to “encourage direct infringement” language used by the MGM Court
regarding advertising and instructions, Chisum’s observation that the
mens rea of inducement is unclear, and the wide variety of rules pro112

CHISUM, supra note 62, § 17.04(2).
No. 73-404-R, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8152 (E.D. Va. June 11, 1974).
114
CHISUM, supra note 62, § 17.04(2).
115
Id.
116
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2779
(2005).
117
CHISUM, supra note 62, §§ 17.04(4)(a)–(g).
118
See supra note 20; see infra Part III.
119
CHISUM, supra note 62, §17.04(4)(f).
120
Id.
113
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posed by the patent law inducement cases, together suggest that in121
ducement is a broad, easy-to-apply, yet extremely unclear rule.
Analysis of patent doctrine does nothing to clarify it.
B. The Incitement Standard and the “Violent Media” Cases: Likely
Heroes
Falling closer to the entertainment industry that spawned MGM,
the incitement rule is overwhelmingly the standard used in what may
122
be referred to broadly as the “violent media” line of cases.
The incitement standard is the best tool with which to clarify the inducement rule because the “violent media” incitement cases, like MGM,
involve secondary liability related to expression. In these cases, a
media entity (such as a musician or a movie producer) disseminates
his or her entertainment product, a consumer of that product (a listener of the music or a viewer of the movie) subsequently inflicts
harm upon herself or harms a third party, and the media entity is
123
These cases provide an intriguing overblamed for such conduct.
view of the application of the incitement test to speakers whose pri124
mary purpose in speech is creative, often copyrightable, expression.
Despite divergences in jurisdictions, these cases overwhelmingly conclude in the protection of the arts and the speakers who disseminate
125
these expressive products.
The incitement test, itself, stands in stark contrast to the loose
requirements of the inducement rule. As set forth in Brandenburg v.
126
Ohio, the incitement standard says that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
127
action.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in Brandenburg, emphasized that statutes violate First Amendment rights by proscribing
“the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral
121
MGM, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2779–80. For an overview of the nuances of the patent
inducement rule, see supra note 109.
122
As discussed below, the label “violent media cases” comes from the common
presence in these cases of a media consumer committing a violent act upon himself
or others allegedly at the behest of the media speaker.
123
See generally infra note 188.
124
See generally infra note 188.
125
But see infra note 185.
126
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
127
Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
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necessity for a resort to force and violence.”
The incitement standard is a test that requires a higher level of scrutiny and arguably provides a greater level of protection to speakers, as it requires both imminence of lawless action and likelihood that the speech will cause
129
such action.
In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader held a rally on his farm
130
and invited a television reporter to tape the action.
He was consequently convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for
his advocacy of “the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform” and for assembling “with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the
131
The cameras caught images of
doctrines of criminal syndicalism.”
hooded figures carrying firearms gathered around a burning cross,
spouting racial epithets, and giving inflammatory speeches about
their hatred of minorities and taking “revengeance” on the govern132
The Brandenburg Court adopted and
ment for oppressing whites.
applied the above test and held that the Ohio statute was invalid, as it
proscribed mere advocacy of violence and not “incitement to immi133
As stated above, this is the bedrock test apnent lawless action.”
plied in the following media/expression-related cases.
134
In Byers v. Edmonson the plaintiff, Byers, was shot and rendered
135
paralyzed during a convenience store robbery.
The shooter, Sarah
Edmondson, and her boyfriend Benjamin Darrus, had left their
home in Oklahoma to go to a concert, but instead engaged in a
multi-state shooting spree ending in one murder and Byers’s paraly136
Upon their apprehension, Edmonson explained that the cousis.
ple had watched the movie Natural Born Killers the night before their
137
trip.
She noted that they had watched the movie several times re138
Edmonson claimed they
cently and that they had taken LSD.
would not have taken a gun on their trip but for watching the movie,
and that the movie had a “numbing influence” on them which
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)).
Id. at 447.
Id. at 445–47.
Id. at 444–45.
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445–47.
Id. at 448–49.
826 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 553 n.2.
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sparked a desire to feel “the power of violence.”
Byers consequently filed a lawsuit against the couple, as well as Time Warner, the
production company behind Natural Born Killers, and Oliver Stone,
140
Byers’s theory was that the murderous couple
the film’s director.
was inspired and incited by the movie, and that the movie’s content
141
had caused their violent behavior.
The Louisiana appellate court held that, despite the abundance
of violent imagery in the movie, it did not constitute incitement because nothing in the movie necessarily “exhorts, urges, entreats, solicits, or overtly advocates or encourages unlawful or violent activity on
142
The movie did not “purport to order or comthe part of viewers.”
mand anyone to perform any concrete action immediately or at any
specific time,” nor did it ever direct nor urge viewers “to commit any
143
type of imminent lawless activity.”
The Byers court viewed the film and decided that this was a
“copycat scenario” that did not remove the film from First Amendment protection simply because it had “a tendency to lead to vio144
Although the shooters may have imitated the characters in
lence.”
the movie out of inspiration to feel the power they felt while watching
the characters’ violent crime spree, the court decided, as a matter of
law, that Natural Born Killers was not inciteful because it did not “di145
rect or encourage them to take such actions.”
The Byers court focused much of its analysis on the artistic ele146
ments of the movie. The movie was not inciteful because it was not
mainly about violence or murder, but portrayed the life and lifestyle
of the main characters, their relationship, their incidental killing
sprees, and “how their exploits are glorified by the media to the point
147
where they become cultural icons.”
A main point of analysis was
the film’s imagery, such as its frequent colorization changes, cartoon
clips, “facial distortions,” “sitcom laugh tracks,” and use of slow motion and bizarre camera angles, all of which “place[d] [the] film in
148
the realm of fantasy.” This analysis, like in the other cases to follow,
seemed to focus on the expressive elements of the film protected by
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id.
Byers, 826 So. 2d at 554.
Id. at 553–54.
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 557 (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973)).
Id.
Byers, 862 So. 2d at 556.
Id.
Id.
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the First Amendment, coupled with its failure of the Brandenburg
149
test.
150
A similar case, Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., involved
the murder of a young man during a remote incident of gang vio151
lence shortly after a public theater showed the movie The Warriors.
The decedent’s father sued Paramount (the producer and distributor
of the movie), alleging that the movie, a fictional story about gang
violence in New York City, incited his son’s killer to stab him to
152
death.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts viewed the film
and decided that nothing in it constituted incitement despite its
many violent scenes, because at no time did the film “exhort, urge,
entreat, solicit, or overtly advocate or encourage unlawful or violent
153
activity on the part of viewers.” The film did not create a likelihood
of imminent lawless action and it did not command viewers to imme154
The court held that this work of ficdiately commit violent acts.
tion, this creative story, did not constitute unprotected incitement,
and the defendant movie companies were not unreasonable in creat155
ing the work and disseminating it to the public.
Cases involving music follow essentially the same trend and
analysis, yet focus more on lyrics as poetic device and metaphor
156
which lack a direct command to action. In Davidson v. Time Warner,
157
Inc., gang member Ronald Howard shot and killed Texas State
Trooper Bill Davidson after the officer stopped Howard (who was
158
driving a stolen car) for a routine traffic violation.
At the time he
shot Officer Davidson, Howard was listening to 2Pacaplyse Now, a Tu159
pac Shakur rap record. The murdered officer’s family sued Shakur
and the defendant record labels, claiming, inter alia, that the record
160
incited the killing.
A Texas district court held that the plaintiffs could not prove
Howard’s violent action was a likely, imminent result of listening to
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. at 556–57.
536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989).
Id. at 1068.
Id.
Id. at 1071.
Id.
Id. at 1072.
See infra notes 157–84 and accompanying text.
No. V-94-006, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997).
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *6.
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2Pacalypse Now even though Shakur’s intent may have been to pro161
duce such action. “At worst,” the court noted, “Shakur’s intent was
to cause violence some time after the listener considered Shakur’s
162
message. The First Amendment protects such advocacy.” Although
the music and lyrics were insulting and derogatory (or, as Shakur
called them, “revolutionary”), the plaintiffs failed to show that Shakur
intended to incite imminent violence, and even if he did, such vio163
lence was not a likely result of listening to the record.
The court also explained that rational listeners could not possibly believe that “musical lyrics and poetry” were the equivalent of “literal commands or directives to immediate action” aimed specifically
164
at the individual listener. Such a belief would not be in accordance
with First Amendment protection of expressive speech, such as song
165
Simply because “weak-willed individuals may be influenced
lyrics.
by Shakur’s work” does not mean that the courts will remove the
166
work’s First Amendment protection.
167
The Davidson court cites to McCollum v. CBS, Inc., another
landmark music case from several years earlier, involving heavy metal
168
icon Ozzy Osbourne.
In McCollum, a teenager shot himself while
169
listening to Osbourne’s record.
Despite the teenager’s substance
abuse problems and emotional turmoil, his parents sued Osbourne
and the accompanying record labels for proximately causing their
170
One of their theories was incitement to imminent
son’s suicide.
171
lawless action via a song called Suicide Solution.
As in the previous cases, a California appellate court in McCollum
172
could find no incitement.
Intent and likelihood of violence were
161

Id. at *63.
Id.
163
Davidson, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at *66. The court noted that the record had been released three years prior and had sold over 400,000 copies; that being said, the Davidsons were the first parties to bring an incitement suit against Shakur and the record labels, making it unlikely that the album caused Howard’s violent
behavior. Id. Howard was also a gang member driving a stolen car, most likely fearing arrest, which suggests even a lesser likelihood that the murder was triggered by
the music. Id.
164
Id. at *67–*68 (citing McCollum v. CBS, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 194 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988)).
165
Id. at *68.
166
Id. at *70.
167
249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
168
Id. at 188.
169
Id. at 189.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 190–91.
172
Id. at 194–95.
162
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absent, as the decedent was not even listening to Suicide Solution at
the time of his death; imminency was lacking because nothing in Osbourne’s songs “could be characterized as a command to an immedi173
ate suicidal act.” Taking the lyrics literally, the court still could not
find that they constituted a command to commit suicide, and if they
174
had, such action was not demanded at a specific, immediate time.
The McCollum court noted that when judges act as censors, the lyrics
of a song can be seriously misconstrued, especially when they were
meant to be “a play on words, to convey meanings entirely contrary to
175
those asserted by plaintiff.”
Ultimately, the court held that creative expression such as song
lyrics and poetry could not be “construed to contain the requisite
‘call to action’” and that a reasonable listener would interpret the lyr176
Rational persons
ics as poetic device, symbolism, or metaphor.
could not mistake lyrical expression for specific, personal, immediate
commands to take imminent violent action, and the First Amend177
The court noted
ment does not permit any contrary assumption.
that art which causes a depressive mood does not automatically constitute incitement, and the philosophical ideas regarding suicide as a
plausible alternative to life can be freely advocated and constitute
protected expression no matter how bizarre or controversial they may
178
be.
A few years after McCollum, Osbourne ran into the same problem
179
regarding his music in a case called Waller v. Osbourne.
Another
young man took his own life supposedly while listening to an Osbourne record, and his parents sued the artist for disseminating mu180
sic that purportedly incited their son to kill himself. A Georgia district court found a lack of incitement because Osbourne’s music was
not “directed toward any particular person or group of persons” and
there was no evidence that the music “was intended to produce acts
of suicide and likely to cause imminent acts of suicide; nor could one
181
rationally infer such a meaning from the lyrics.” The plaintiffs had

173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
Id. at 1145.
Id. at 1151.
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not even proved that the decedent had listened to the song right be182
fore he shot himself.
The court’s analysis of Suicide Solution mirrored the McCollum
court’s analysis by emphasizing that philosophical assertions about
suicide constituting “abstract discussion” are not equivalent to an
imminent urge or encouragement that someone should take such ac183
tion. This artistic expression did not rise to the level of incitement
to imminent lawless action and was therefore shielded by First
184
Amendment protections.
At this point in the analysis it is important to note that incitement is a valid test—not a neutered one—despite the vast majority of
media incitement cases concluding in the same manner. The test is
not merely mechanically applied with the blind expectation that
every case will turn out the same; incitement is valid because there
are exceptions to the general rule—where the media have been
found liable for incitement—as seen in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises,
185
Inc. In this case, the publishers of a book called Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors were found liable when a hired
contract killer precisely followed the detailed instructions in the
186
guidebook for murder to aid him in committing a triple homicide.
The book and its publisher lost their First Amendment protection
because the book went beyond mere advocacy and constituted incitement, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the publisher had aided and abetted the murders via
187
the guidebook.

182

Id. at 1151 n.15.
Id.
184
The Waller court also engaged in a lengthy discussion about the plaintiff’s allegations that Osbourne’s songs contained subliminal messages. Id. at 1146–48. The
court ultimately decided that such messages did not exist; however, this is not determinative for incitement purposes. Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1148–50.
185
128 F.3d 233, 250 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that the district court had “erred . . .
[when it misunderstood] . . . Brandenburg to protect not just abstract advocacy of lawlessness and the open criticism of government and its institutions, but also the teaching of the technical methods of criminal activity—in this case, the technical methods
of murder”).
186
Id. at 239.
187
Id. at 250, 255.
183
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The violent media cases do follow a clear trend, however.
Expressive, often copyrightable, creations such as movies, music, and
song lyrics have almost never been found to have incited imminent
lawless action. Such expression generally finds solid protection under the First Amendment behind the shield of the Brandenburg incitement test. The speech at issue in MGM would likely fall in step
with the majority of these incitement cases, as opposed to the exception, Rice; this issue is addressed in more detail in the following section. The speech at issue in MGM—advertisements, marketing
schemes, and internal communications—do not come anywhere
close to a detailed hitman manual, and as copyrightable commercial
material, would fall much closer to the side of the fence where the
creative expression seen in the violent media cases fell. The only ex189
ception may be Grokster’s newsletter to users, mentioned above,
which may or may not find solace under even a stricter inducement
test. Therefore, were inducement interpreted in a stricter, more prospeech, incitement-esque light, the majority of the commercial
speech at issue in MGM would be shielded by the First Amendment,
190
and the speakers would be immune from secondary liability.
III. INDUCEMENT AND INCITEMENT AS DISTINCT: SECONDARY
LIABILITY FOR EXPRESSION AND THE NECESSITY FOR COPYRIGHT TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THE FIRST AMENDMENT
By placing inducement and incitement side by side, the reader
can see that the two standards are very different. Incitement, generally, is an extremely difficult standard to meet—especially in the context of creative, often copyrightable, expression such as music, movies, and song lyrics—as it requires both imminent illegal action and a
191
likelihood that the illegal action will occur.
Inducement, on the
other hand, is a more expansive and ambiguous test that is not altogether clear, and is easily satisfied in the patent infringement cases

188

See also James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 697–99 (6th Cir. 2002) (video
games, movies, and internet pornography did not incite school shooter’s killing
spree); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1022–23 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Hustler magazine did not incite boy’s accidental suicide by hanging after he read an
article about autoerotic asphyxia, a dangerous sexual practice); Olivia N. v. Nat’l
Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (rape scene in a television
movie did not incite copycat rape of a young girl); Pahler v. Slayer, No. CV 79356,
2001 WL 1736476, at *4 (Cal. Super. Oct. 29, 2001) (death metal band, Slayer, did
not incite rape and murder of a young girl through song lyrics).
189
See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text.
190
See infra Part III.
191
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see supra Part II.B.
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192

mentioned above.
As a general proposition, incitement is a more
speech-protective doctrine because it is harder to satisfy the test.
Logically, the harder the test is to satisfy, the more speech will retain
193
its First Amendment protection. More often than not, political and
194
creative speech will escape incitement liability. Inducement, however, has historically been used in a strictly patent context and its ap195
plication has often been successful.
The speech at issue in MGM—advertisements, marketing plans,
press releases, and internal communications regarding such plans—
196
are granted First Amendment protection as commercial speech.
The commercial speech in MGM is more akin to the copyrightable
creative and expressive speech protected by the incitement standard
197
in the violent media cases, as opposed to the inventions and processes which are afforded strict patent protection to which the in198
ducement standard applies.
Courts should interpret the MGM inducement rule in light of the incitement standard and thus make
inducement a more speech-protective test that preserves First
199
As noted
Amendment rights of software designers and advertisers.
192

For an overview of the nuances of the patent inducement rule, see supra note

109.
193
194
195

See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448–49.
See supra Part II.B.
For an overview of the nuances of the patent inducement rule, see supra note

109.
196

See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980) (Commercial speech is protected, generally, if it constitutes speech,
it is lawful, and it is not misleading.). Although it could be argued that the speech at
issue here is not legal (and therefore not protected commercial speech) because it
“induces” copyright infringement, this circular assertion simply begs the issue. If the
test to be used were stricter, like incitement, the speech would not be found illegal
because it would lack immanency. See supra Part II.B. To argue that the speech at
issue in MGM falls outside commercial speech protection goes beyond the scope of
this Comment and creates a circular argument that defeats the purpose of determining the proper test to use in circumstances similar to MGM.
197
Joel Timmer, When a Commercial is Not a Commercial: Advertising of Violent Entertainment and the First Amendment, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 157, 186 (2002) (“Because advertising of media products often embodies ideas or opinions in the underlying
works, courts will likely accord such advertising the same level of First Amendment
protection given the artistic expression in the works themselves.”).
198
For an overview of the nuances of the patent inducement rule, see supra note
109.
199
It is inconsequential that the violent media cases do not touch on the issue of
copyrightability. The analogy here is that the expression in the violent media cases
fell under one test (incitement), and would be the subject of copyright protection,
whereas the intellectual property in the inducement cases fell under another test
(inducement), and would be the subject of patent protection. The key is that the
speech in MGM falls more on the side of the violent media cases than the patent inducement cases. Therefore, it should fall under an interpretation of inducement
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above, incitement is the best way to clarify the already-hazy induce200
ment standard, and by interpreting inducement in this way, the
speech at issue in MGM would not pass muster based on the analysis
of the violent media cases, and would therefore be protected under
201
the First Amendment.
This proposition of a paradigmatic shift in the interpretation of
the inducement standard is born out of the notion that copyright and
patent protect very different types of intellectual property. The copyright statute states that copyright protection applies to “original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi202
cated.”
Copyright protection specifically does not apply to “any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
203
Patprinciple, or discovery” despite the form in which it appears.
ent protection, however, extends to inventions or discoveries of “any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
204
Patent promatter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”
tection will imbue if a product or process is useful, novel, and non205
obvious.
Patent protection is more a form of idea protection than
copyright even though the inventor must have documentation of his
invention in the form of a patent application (including an oath,
drawings, models or specimens, and specific claims of protection) to
206
The inventor generally need not even work the inget protection.
vention to maintain this security because the inventor has protected
the idea by reduction to practice or constructive reduction to prac207
tice.

more akin to the incitement test instead of the more generous patent inducement
test, because the speech in MGM is a closer analogue to copyrightable speech than to
patentable inventions.
200
See supra Part II.B.
201
See supra Part II.B. The advertisements to former users, offerings of software,
diversion of search queries, technical assistance, and refusal to filter content would
likely fail a stricter interpretation of the inducement rule, and therefore be protected
under the First Amendment. Grokster’s newsletter promoting its ability to find copyrighted material may be the only questionable element in light of Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
202
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
203
Id. § 102(b).
204
35 U.S.C. § 100 (2000).
205
Id. §§ 101–03.
206
Id. §§ 111–15.
207
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 439–40 (rev. 5th ed. 2004).
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Copyright protection is much more narrowly drawn in protecting only expression of ideas and not ideas themselves, or inventions
embodying ideas. Nevertheless, copyright is a more mercurial concept than patent, which, although more idea-protective than copyright, is more tangible in its protection of concrete products and in208
ventions. What may constitute expression of an idea is vaguer.
Inducement seems more appropriate for patent cases because it is a
looser, broader standard that can apply easily in cases where a tangible, valuable product or idea is infringed, even based on advertising
or marketing. The stricter standard of incitement, on the other
hand, applies more appropriately to expressive speech, which is more
likely to be the subject of copyright, simply because of its elusive nature. Perhaps because free expression is a broad concept and a valued activity, courts and legislatures have accepted a stricter test in order to give more First Amendment protection to what they view as a
209
valuable constitutional right. Because the commercial speech at issue in MGM is a closer cousin to the expressive copyrightable speech
found privileged in the “violent media” incitement cases, an incitement-influenced reading of inducement should apply to the advertisements and marketing plans at use in MGM, which may themselves
210
be considered expressive and creative, and therefore copyrightable.
In MGM, copyright law essentially trumps free speech in advertisements and marketing schemes. The Supreme Court of the United
208
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–02, 107 (1879) (early Supreme Court case
identifying the confusion inherent in the idea/expression dichotomy).
209
See Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas
and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 302–03 (2003) (“Brandenburg
is . . . more protective of speech than Holmes’ [clear and present danger] standard
because it demands a closer connection between speech and unlawful action . . . .
‘[R]are will be the speech that not only advocates lawless action, but is likely to accomplish that result imminently.’”) (internal citations omitted); William Li, Unbaking
the Adolescent Cake: The Constitutional Implications of Imposing Tort Liability on Publishers
of Violent Video Games, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 467 (2003):
[Brandenburg] operates as a higher standard of causation[;] . . . application of the usual standard of proximate cause has the potential to expose the media to tort liability for just about any creative work that
somehow inspires a child or mentally ill individual to commit an act of
violence. Therefore, Brandenburg requires “incitement” as a higher
standard of causation than mere “influence” or “inspiration” . . . [and]
constitutes a viable compromise between a plaintiff’s interests in compensation and a defendant’s free speech interests.
Id. at 493–94 (internal citations omitted).
210
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903)
(finding that lithograph advertisements were sufficiently expressive to be considered
copyrightable expression; advertisements were not exempt from copyright protection
simply because they served a commercial purpose).
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States, however, has applied a patent test in a copyright situation. Future courts should recognize this disparity and realize that the speech
at issue is more akin to the copyrightable speech in the “violent media” incitement cases as opposed to the patented products protected
in the inducement cases. Because the Court in MGM favors copyright
protection over free speech, it should employ a more copyrightapplicable test as opposed to a broad patent test. In arguing this
proposition, it is important to reiterate the conflict between free
speech and copyright and explain the goals of each doctrine.
Copyright protection and free speech conflict in that the First
Amendment instructs the government “not to abridge speech on the
one hand, and the Copyright (and Patent) Clause . . . permits Con211
gress to limit speech, on the other.” That being said, the long-term
goal of copyright protection and the short-term goal of free speech
212
often clash. Generally speaking, the long-term goal of copyright “is
the enhancement of learning, the advancement of knowledge and
the progress of science” through a limited monopoly on certain
qualified forms of expression, whereas the goal of the First Amendment is immediate freedom from government interference with
213
The long-term goal of copyright protection restricts free
speech.
speech for the short-term “and has the practical effect of strengthen214
ing the property rights during that period.”
215
Recent cases, such as Eldred v. Ashcroft, have extended this
property right even further, resulting in even more limitation on free
speech in the short-run in favor of copyright protection in the long216
run.
The plaintiff in Eldred ran an online service allowing free
downloads of public domain books; he challenged the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
(“CTEA”) arguing, inter alia, violation of his First Amendment rights
217
The Suto make speech accessible to those who visit his website.
preme Court of the United States ultimately found that the CTEA
(which added an extra twenty years of copyright protection to new
and existing works) was constitutional, and rejected the plaintiff’s
218
claims of conflict with the First Amendment.
211

Birnhack, supra note 11, at 1304.
Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and Breaking-Up, 43 IDEA 233, 293 (2003).
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
216
Id. at 218–21.
217
Id. at 192–94.
218
Id. at 218–21.
212
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In the MGM context, the short-term result in applying the inducement test would be to restrict speech by advertisers and software
manufacturers by favoring the long-term goal of copyright protection
of authors whose materials may (or may not) be infringed. Essentially, the MGM Court is validating this existing “copyright exception
to the First Amendment,” which was recently bolstered and upgraded
219
by Eldred.
Volokh suggests that Eldred created an important boundary to
this “copyright exception”: “The copyright exception immunizes only
laws that protect creative expression rather than facts or ideas” and
the allowance of free communication of facts balances the free
speech/copyright scales, thus making copyright law constitutional
220
based on its built-in “idea/expression dichotomy.”
As mentioned
above, this protection is different from the protection afforded by
221
patent law, which generally allows for the protection of ideas.
Volokh also points out, however, that despite the
idea/expression dichotomy and the seemingly universal protection
on the expression of factual information, copyright law may indeed
restrict publication of facts in some circumstances: when a newspaper
publishes “a story about a store that sells some infringing material”
and the story “mentions the store’s name and address” or when a
website provides the name and URL of another web site that distrib222
utes infringing material.
In Volokh’s hypotheticals, the speakers’
publication of facts could constitute contributory infringement of the
223
copyrights at issue.
In the MGM context, such publication of facts could constitute
inducement on the part of the newspaper publisher, writer, webmaster, or website designer. Because the broad-based inducement rule
adopted in MGM is a patent standard, it does not take into account
the inherent effects the rule could have on otherwise freely expressible factual assertions because there simply are no free speech issues in
the patent context. Were future courts to interpret the inducement
rule in light of incitement, a more copyright-friendly and speechfriendly doctrine, the conflict seen in the MGM context would dissolve. Arguably, the advertisements and marketing schemes at issue

219

Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 713 (2003).
220
Id. at 713–14.
221
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 207, at 439–40.
222
Volokh, supra note 219, at 715.
223
Id.
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224

in MGM were inherently factual, which would afford them protection under an altered, stricter interpretation of the inducement rule,
despite the fact that traditional copyright law (as expressed by Volokh’s examples) may still bar the speech under a contributory in225
fringement theory.
CONCLUSION
Courts facing future cases analogous to MGM should utilize an
incitement-tinged interpretation of the inducement rule as opposed
to strictly interpreting the test in a broad patent sense. The inducement rule, as it stands, is murky and unworkable, and would lead to
courts perpetuating secondary liability for expression on a convoluted path toward a state of confusion. Clarification of inducement
in light of incitement and the “violent media” cases, as well as differentiating between the types of intellectual property protected by each
test, will afford more First Amendment protection to advertisers and
marketers of P2P software, and will ensure that both their advertisements and disclaimers will receive the protection they constitutionally
deserve. The goal of affording this protection is, of course, to prevent a chilling effect on speech and innovation, alike. This proposed
interpretation of the test, however, is not without teeth, and could
226
still bar speech in some factual circumstances.
To say that illicit downloading and the proliferation of P2P software in the last several years is a contentious issue would be an understatement. Amidst the melee and mudslinging, the defiance of
downloaders and the counter-defiance of the copyright owners, as
well as the staggering number of lawsuits, the issue of free speech
seems to have been lost, hiding under a rock in hopes of avoiding the
crossfire. Nevertheless, free speech implications are unavoidable
when dealing with the marketing and advertising of P2P software or
any technology. If courts are going to deal with the conflict between
copyright and technological innovation, they will also have to deal
with the First Amendment’s potential conflicts with inducement.
When these issues inevitably arise, courts should employ an interpretation of the MGM inducement rule in light of the “violent media”
incitement cases to ensure as much First Amendment protection to
advertisements and marketing schemes as courts should analogously
224

For a description of these materials, see supra note 20.
Volokh, supra note 219, at 715–16.
226
As mentioned in supra note 201, Grokster’s newsletter promoting its ability to
find copyrighted material may be the only questionable element in light of Rice v.
Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
225
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afford to the technological innovations that act as the impetus for
such commercial speech.

